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Abstract This article introduces the special issue on Srebrenica by reflecting on how
the fall of Srebrenica has served as a trigger for proposals to fundamentally transform
international law, especially the law relating to international crimes, responsibility, and
legal remedies for victims. It also assesses the efforts to reformUN peacekeeping in the
wake of Srebrenica, including issues relating to mission creep and to robust peace-
keeping. Lastly, the article introduces the six other contributions to this special issue.
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1 Introduction
Twenty years ago, in July 1995, in one of the worst massacres in Europe after the
Second World War, Bosnian Serb militia under the command of General Ratko
Mladic´ killed about 8000 Bosnian Muslim men and boys in the vicinity of the
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Bosnian town of Srebrenica. Combined with the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, the
massacre came to symbolize the failure of the international community to prevent or
stop the most gruesome atrocities committed against civilians.
The Netherlands International Law Review has decided to devote a special issue
to commemorate the event in Srebrenica. Our Review’s interest in the matter is not
accidental. The military battalion of the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) which
was based near Srebrenica—and which arguably failed to prevent the massacre—
was Dutch (‘Dutchbat’). Srebrenica has haunted the Dutch political and military
establishment ever since.1 In 2002, as a result of an explosive report written by the
Netherlands Institute for War Documentation,2 the Dutch Government even stepped
down, with the Prime Minister acknowledging a modicum of responsibility,
although not culpability, for Dutchbat’s failures. Subsequently, victims initiated
legal proceedings before the Dutch courts against the Netherlands and the United
Nations, some of which were still ongoing at the time of writing.
Our ambition is not to give an overview of the massacre itself or of the
international/national responses to it. Rather, wewant to reflect on how Srebrenica has
served as the trigger for proposals to fundamentally transform international law,
especially the law relating to international crimes, responsibility, and remedies for
victims, and how it has affected theUN’s institutional capacity to respond to atrocities.
2 The Impact of the Srebrenica Massacre on International Law
The Srebrenica massacre has had a major impact on various fields of international
law.
Firstly, international criminal prosecutions brought against presumed individual
offenders of the Srebrenica massacre, especially before the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), have fostered the development of the
law of genocide, and of the modes of individual criminal responsibility, e.g.,
command responsibility, and aiding and abetting.
Secondly, the multitude of actors actively or passively involved in the
massacre—the Bosnian Serb militia, the Serbian army, the United Nations, and
the Netherlands—have (re)kindled the international community’s interest in
questions of allocating responsibility between organized actors. When could the
responsibility of a state be engaged with respect to international wrongful acts
committed by a non-state armed group with which the state has some relationship?
Are wrongful acts committed by UN peacekeepers attributable to the UN, to the
troop-contributing nation, or rather to both?
Thirdly, the massacre has spurred the quest for accountability avenues and
practically available remedies against responsible parties. In respect of a substantial
number of atrocities in the aftermath of Srebrenica, fact-finding and inquiry
1 See for example the book by former Dutch Defence Minister Voorhoeve (2015).
2 Nederlands Instituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie (2002); NIOD Institute for War, Holocaust and
Genocide Studies, Srebrenica: Reconstruction, background, consequences and analyses of the fall of a
‘safe area’, 10 April 2002. This report is available at http://www.srebrenica.nl. One of the principal
conclusions of the report is that ‘the Dutch had to keep the peace where there was no peace’.
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commissions were established, whose reports documented the extent of the
devastation, and could serve as the trigger for criminal prosecutions. International
criminal tribunals—including the International Criminal Court, the Statute of which
was signed just 3 years after Srebrenica—and national courts assumed their
responsibility to fight impunity and dispense justice for the gravest crimes against
humankind. (National) civil courts opened their doors to victims of massacres,
thereby raising the question of the relationship between human rights and private
international law. International organizations, such as the UN, were no longer seen
as just ‘do-gooders’, but as entities whose actions could adversely impact
individuals’ enjoyment of human rights; this re-characterization gave rise to a
questioning of their immunities before domestic courts and to the need for
accessible dispute-resolution mechanisms to provide justice to victims.3
Fourthly, the apparent failings of the UN forced the organization to overhaul its
capacity to adequately respond to Srebrenica-like massacres. This fourth impact will
be the subject of the next section. The impact on the first three fields, which in
essence pertain to questions of accountability, will in some detail be addressed by
the other contributions to this special issue.
3 UN Peacekeeping Reform in the Wake of Srebrenica
Srebrenica’s most important impact on the United Nations was that the massacre
served as a trigger for the development of the doctrine of a ‘Responsibility to
Protect’ (R2P) incumbent on the international community to protect vulnerable
populations against genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against
humanity. This R2P has entered both UN discourse and practice; in its peaceful and
non-peaceful (military intervention) dimensions, it features prominently in the 2005
World Summit Outcome.4 The UN Secretary-General’s report on ‘Implementing the
responsibility to protect’5 has subsequently animated discussions throughout the
United Nations system.6 R2P has not just remained a theoretical discourse, however.
The UN has notably acted thereon by establishing a Peacebuilding Commission,
an intergovernmental advisory body at the heart of the UN system that supports
peace efforts in countries emerging from conflict,7 and by giving Security Council
3 See on this Blokker and Schrijver (2014).
4 UN General Assembly Resolution 60/1, World Summit Outcome, UN Doc. A/RES/60/1 (24 October
2005), paras. 138–139.
5 UN General Assembly, Implementing the responsibility to protect, Report of the Secretary-General,
UN Doc. A/63/677 (12 January 2009). See also the report Fulfilling our collective responsibility:
International assistance and the Responsibility to Protect, Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc.
A/68/947 (September 2014).
6 Zyberi (2013), ch. 4–8, 16–17 (discussing the roles of the UN Security Council, the General Assembly,
the Secretary-General, the Human Rights Council, the International Law Commission, the International
Court of Justice, and the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda).
7 See United Nations Peacebuilding Commission. http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/. Accessed 13
February 2015. This commission was established by UN General Assembly Resolution 60/180, The
Peacebuilding Commission, UN Doc. A/RES/60/180 (30 December 2005) and UN Security Council
Resolution 1645, UN Doc. S/RES/1645 (20 December 2005).
Lessons Learned from the Srebrenica Massacre 221
123
mandates to use military force to protect civilians against their own regime, e.g., in
Libya and Coˆte d’Ivoire.8 However, so far the Security Council has failed to apply
R2P to the situation in Syria.9
Most importantly, the UN has taken a critical look at its peacekeeping capacity in
the light of its responsibility to protect vulnerable populations. Peacekeeping,
although not provided for in the UN Charter, has become one of the mainstays of
UN activity, ever since the 1956 Suez crisis, when the first mission was
established.10 For the fiscal year 1 July 2014–30 June 2015, peacekeeping expenses
amounted to close to 8.5 billion USD per year,11 by far the largest operational
expenses of the UN. As we write, more than 100,000 peacekeepers are under arms
in 16 theatres, led by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations.12
The peacekeeping operations in both Rwanda and Bosnia-Hercegovina have been
received critically by the UN itself.13 After these failures, the peacekeeping
missions stopped being just passive forces interposed between parties to a conflict;
instead, almost all of them were endowed with a primary mandate to protect
civilians. In particular the 2000 Brahimi report—a report that laid bare the
inefficiencies of peacekeeping and called for more robust peacekeeping—has been
instrumental in bringing about this shift.14 At the time of writing, a report by a High-
Level Panel that takes stock of UN peacekeeping reforms since the adoption of the
Brahimi report, as well as of special political missions, had just been published. This
report explored new landscapes in peacekeeping and conflict prevention, called for a
8 UN Security Council Resolution 1973, UN Doc. S/RES/1973 (17 March 2011) and UN Security
Council Resolution 1975, UN Doc. S/RES/1975 (30 March 2011).
9 In UN Security Council Resolution 2139 the Council hints at R2P by demanding that ‘all parties take
all appropriate steps to protect civilians, including members of ethnic, religious and confessional
communities, and stresses that, in this regard, the primary responsibility to protect its population lies with
the Syrian authorities’, UN Doc. S/RES/2139 (22 February 2014), para. 9.
10 UN General Assembly Resolution 1001 (ES-I), UN Doc. A/RES/1001 (7 November 1956), established
UNEF.
11 See United Nations Peacekeeping, Financing peacekeeping. http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/
operations/financing.shtml. Accessed 15 July 2015; UN Doc. A/C.5/69/17.
12 See United Nations Peacekeeping, Current peacekeeping operations. http://www.un.org/en/
peacekeeping/operations/current.shtml. Accessed 15 July 2015 and United Nations Peacekeeping,
Peacekeeping factsheet. http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/factsheet.shtml. Acces-
sed 15 July 2015.
13 See reports of the UN Secretary-General, The Fall of Srebrenica, UN Doc. A/54/549 (15 November
1999) and The independent inquiry into the actions of the United Nations during the 1994 genocide in
Rwanda, UN Doc. S/1999/1257 (15 December 1999).
14 UN General Assembly, Identical letters dated 21 August 2000 from the Secretary-General to the
President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council: report of the Panel on
United Nations Peace Operations (the so-called Brahimi report), UN Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809 (21
August 2000). See for leading UN documents adopted after the report: UN Department of Peacekeeping
Operations and Department of Field Support (2009) A new partnership agenda: Charting a new horizon
for UN peacekeeping. http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/newhorizon.pdf. Accessed 13
February 2015; UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support (2010) The
new horizon initiative: Progress report No. 1. http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/
newhorizon_update01.pdf. Accessed 13 February 2015; UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
and Department of Field Support (2011) The new horizon initiative: Progress report No. 2. http://www.
un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/newhorizon_update02.pdf. Accessed 13 February 2015.
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focus on political solutions and for responsive and flexible peace operations (the
collective term for both peacekeeping operations and special political missions), and
proposed stronger partnerships with regional organizations and troop-contributing
countries as well as field-focused and people-centred mandates.15 A key recom-
mendation of the report relates to the protection of civilians, with the report stating
that every peacekeeper—civilian, military, police—must do all they can when
civilians are under imminent threat. The report highlights that political leverage and
influence can be more powerful than military response, and that, to deliver on the
protection of civilians, the current gap in many missions between resources and
mandates needs to be addressed.
Also various intermediary reports have been quite critical of UN peacekeeping,
although they also hailed its successes in devising specific strategies to protect
civilians (notably by engaging in political work and deterring attacks through the
provision of physical security on UN bases), as well as in establishing early-warning
systems.16 The strongest criticism levelled at UN peacekeeping was that the chain of
events to support the protection of civilians was broken. A 2014 report drawn up by
the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) was particularly damning in
this respect, accusing the UN and troop-contributing nations of failing civilians in
need and thus of undermining the raison d’eˆtre of UN peacekeeping.17 Although
most UN peacekeeping missions can currently use—lethal—force to protect
civilians—so not only in self-defence, in practice it turns out that such force is
hardly used: according to OIOS, only four missions have ever fired a warning shot,
and only three missions have ever intended to use (but did not necessarily use) lethal
force.18 OIOS may perhaps focus excessively on the use of force, thereby
downplaying political solutions,19 but in order to prevent a scenario like Srebrenica,
there is no denying that the use of lethal force will sometimes be necessary, as a last
resort. It is most unfortunate, 20 years after Srebrenica, that troop-contributing
nations still consider that the risks of using force and even of having boots on the
15 Report of High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, chaired by former President of Timor-
Leste and Nobel Laureate Jose´ Ramos-Horta, 16 June 2015, forthcoming as official UN doc. See also
http://www.un.org. Accessed 15 July 2015.
16 See notably a 2009 independent study jointly commissioned by the Department of Peacekeeping
Operations and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs: V Holt, G Taylor and M Kelly
(2009) Protecting civilians in the context of UN peacekeeping operations: Successes, setbacks and
remaining challenges. https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/Protecting%20Civilians%20in%
20the%20Context%20of%20UN%20Peacekeeping%20Operations.pdf. Accessed 13 February 2015; UN
General Assembly, Evaluation of the implementation and results of protection of civilians mandates in
United Nations peacekeeping operations: Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services, Peace-
keeping missions with protection of civilians mandates focus on prevention and mitigation activities and
force is almost never used to protect civilians under attack, UN Doc. A/68/787 (7 March 2014) (‘OIOS
report’).
17 OIOS report (2014).
18 See OIOS report, para. 25.
19 Annex I of the OIOS report, Comments on the draft report received from the Department of
Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support, para. 3 (‘we are concerned that the
approach of the report overemphasizes one element of military action and devalues the importance of
political solutions and other aspects of the comprehensive approach peacekeeping operations take in
implementing their protection mandate’).
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ground are too high, that peacekeepers are not always following orders of the UN
but rather of their own capitals, that non-compliance with UN orders is not reported,
that hierarchical decision-making causes delays in reaction, that missions are weak
and spread too thinly, that proper information-gathering fails, and that peacekeepers
fear penalties for action rather than for inaction.20 In light of these problems,
Srebrenica redux is not fanciful. To give just one example, in spite of the presence
of a UN peacekeeping mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), in 2014 the newly-
established state descended into a vicious civil war in the course of which
abominable atrocities against civilians were committed—tens of thousands of
civilians have reportedly been massacred—21 without UNMISS being able to
intervene.22
Some better news has come from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC),
however. Concerned about the continuing threat posed by ragtag armed groups in
the lawless east of that country, in 2013, the UN Security Council gave the UN
peacekeeping mission MONUSCO—the world’s largest peacekeeping mission—the
explicit mandate to establish an ‘Intervention Brigade’ to ‘neutralize’ such armed
groups.23 MONUSCO could claim some initial success, defeating the rebels of M23,
and was engaged in a major operation, alongside DRC forces,24 against the
Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), an outfit with its roots in
the Rwandan genocide. MONUSCO is the only UN peacekeeping mission that
conducts offensive operations against armed groups threatening civilians. In this
regard, the UN Security Council has been cautious not to make it a precedent for
future peacekeeping operations: in the pertinent resolution, it stipulated that
20 These are indeed the deficiencies identified by OIOS.
21 See International Crisis Group, Crisis watch database – South Sudan. http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/
publication-type/crisiswatch/crisiswatch-database.aspx?CountryIDs=%7B8B313EA2-534B-4421-B78C-
776E93632115%7D. Accessed 13 February 2014.
22 Civilians were even killed during attacks on UN bases. See, e.g., BBC News, South Sudan conflict:
Attack on UN base ‘kills dozens’, 17 April 2014. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-27074635.
Accessed 13 February 2015. The International Crisis Group accused UNMISS of lacking a strategic
vision. See International Crisis Group (2015) Sudan and South Sudan’s merging conflicts, Africa report
no. 223, 29 January 2015. http://www.crisisgroup.org/*/media/Files/africa/horn-of-africa/south%
20sudan/223-sudan-and-south-sudan-s-merging-conflicts.pdf. Accessed 13 February 2015.
23 UN Security Council Resolution 2098, UN Doc. S/RES/2098 (28 March 2013).
24 To prevent the UN from siding with (government) troops that are themselves a threat to civilians, the
UN has adopted a Human Rights Due Diligence Policy on United Nations Support to non-United Nations
Security Forces, see UN Secretary-General, Identical letters dated 25 February 2013 from the Secretary-
General addressed to the President of the General Assembly and to the President of the Security Council,
UN Doc. A/67/775-S/2013/110 (5 March 2013). The UN Secretary-General had already advised member
states of his decision to institute this policy by means of a note verbale dated 25 October 2011. See for an
assessment Aust (2014). The application of this policy has led to tensions between the UN and the DRC.
For example, in January 2015, citing the policy, the UN demanded that the DRC remove from the joint
UN-DRC offensive against the rebels in eastern DRC a general who featured on a UN Red List, being
accused of 121 rights violations including summary executions and rape. The DRC rejected the UN’s
demands, calling them a violation of its sovereignty. See Bloomberg News (2015) Congo rejects UN
stance on general in anti-rebel offensive, 5 February 2015. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2015-02-05/congo-rejects-un-stance-on-general-in-offensive-against-rebels. Accessed 13 February 2015.
A failure on the part of the DRC to comply with the UN’s directions may result in the UN taking part in
the offensive, with dire consequences for the civilians whom this push is supposed to protect.
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MONUSCO’s mandate was extended ‘on an exceptional basis and without creating
a precedent or any prejudice to the agreed principles of peacekeeping’.25 Clearly,
the Council is concerned about mission creep, with UN peacekeeping missions
becoming embroiled in a total war, without any exit strategy.26 Still, it is arguable
that only more vigorous peacekeeping mandates that allow UN troops to engage
with armed groups will alleviate the plight of civilians. Such engagement—which
technically amounts to engagement in an armed conflict—does not mean taking
sides between warring parties, thus compromising the hallowed rule of impartiality
in peacekeeping. In fact, it only implies taking the side of the most vulnerable:
civilians being attacked, raped and killed by groups having no regard whatsoever for
human dignity. To be sure, offensive UN operations are not the silver bullet;
ultimately, national institutions should be established that can offer security to
civilians. After all, the primary responsibility to protect their civilians rests with
them. But in the absence of viable alternatives, the UN should not stand idly by.
As can be gleaned from the reports evaluating UN peacekeeping reforms,
however, for more forceful peacekeeping to become entrenched, a change of
mentality rather than a lofty mandate in a resolution is called for. Richer UN
member states should open their purses for beefed-up peacekeeping missions, troop-
contributing nations should place sufficient troops at the UN’s disposal so as to
protect civilians spread over vast conflict areas,27 and these troops should also be
willing to use their weapons to eliminate actual threats against civilians. Otherwise,
Srebrenica will be repeated over and over again—as has unfortunately happened.
4 The Contents of the Special Issue
The contributions to this special issue address, as a matter of course, only some
selected topics, with a focus on developments in the law relating to international
crimes, the law relating to international responsibility, and the law relating to
remedies for victims.
Harmen van der Wilt explores how the massacre in Srebrenica has been
represented in the case law of the ICTY and argues that the reality of Srebrenica has
been distorted somewhat as a result of the idiosyncrasies of the concepts of
individual criminal responsibility, especially the modes of liability (aiding and
abetting, joint criminal enterprise, command responsibility).28 He warns us to be
cautious in interpreting the use of legal concepts as a direct reflection of reality. It is
25 UNSC Resolution 2098, para. 9.
26 See in this respect also UNSC Resolution 2098, para. 10 (‘Decides that the Intervention Brigade will
have a clear exit strategy and that the Council will consider the continued presence of the Intervention
Brigade in light of its performance’).
27 Compare The Economist (2015) Congo and Rwanda: A long-awaited push to destroy some of Africa’s
most notorious killers, 24 January 2015. http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/
21640439-long-awaited-push-destroy-some-africas-most-notorious-killers-ever-again. Accessed 13
February 2015 (observing that ‘[t]he UN will never have enough troops to secure the vast country
[DRC]’).
28 Van der Wilt (2015).
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therefore key to take the limitations of the courtroom into account when assessing
the legacy of the ICTY with respect to Srebrenica.
Kimberley Trapp dissects the International Court of Justice’s decision in the
Bosnia Genocide case–which concerned the massacre in Srebrenica, and criticizes
the Court’s approach to state responsibility for not adequately reflecting the reality
of state engagement with non-state armed groups.29 As is known, the Court held that
the acts of the Bosnian Serb militia were not attributable to the State of Serbia, as
the latter did not exercise effective control over these militia, while nevertheless
holding Serbia responsible for failing to prevent the genocide. Trapp argues that this
approach overlooks contemporary state engagement with armed groups, and instead
advocates the development of a paradigm that holds states responsible when they
actively and materially increase the risk that an international crime will be
committed by an armed group.
Heike Krieger addresses the accountability gap in UN peacekeeping operations
for serious human rights violations perpetrated by UN peacekeepers.30 She observes
that aggrieved individuals face enormous difficulties in seeking redress from the
UN, but notes at the same time that domestic courts may offer viable accountability
options. She admits that such courts typically uphold the UN’s immunity, but draws
attention to evolutions in the case law that point to the attribution of acts of
peacekeepers to, and thus the responsibility of troop-contributing states for rights
violations. She concludes that above all, however, member states need to close the
accountability gap at the level of the United Nations, by establishing appropriate
institutional dispute-settlement mechanisms.
Paolo Palchetti develops Krieger’s point that domestic courts can provide an
appropriate forum to establish responsibility for violations committed within the
framework of peace operations.31 In this respect, he discusses the 2014 judgment of
the District Court of The Hague in the Mothers of Srebrenica case, which attributed
the failure of Dutchbat to provide protection to Bosnian civilians in Srebrenica to
the Dutch State, and held the latter responsible vis-a`-vis the victims. Palchetti takes
the view that the District Court went too far in attributing certain acts to the Dutch
State, while not going far enough when (not) attributing other acts. He concludes,
however, that Mothers of Srebrenica is an important precedent in that it bases
attribution on effective control rather than legal status, and allows for the possibility
of dual attribution to both the UN and the troop-contributing state. The matter is
currently under review before a court of appeal.
Larissa van den Herik shifts the focus from judicial dispute settlements to inquiry
commissions as a method of fact-finding and truth-finding, with special reference to
the UN and Dutch inquiries into the Srebrenica massacre.32 She argues that,
depending on the authority with which inquiry commissions and their findings are
endowed, fact-finding inquiries can play a meaningful complementary role to




32 Van den Herik (2015).
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importantly, they can be instrumental in namely overcoming the limitations of
international criminal law which reduces conflict to the behaviour of just a few
individuals (see also the article by Van der Wilt).
Kirsten Schmalenbach, finally, discusses the jurisdictional immunity of the
United Nations before domestic courts and certain limitations to this.33 Taking the
Dutch Supreme Court’s affirmation of the UN’s immunity in the Mothers of
Srebrenica case as her starting point, she warns that lifting the UN’s immunity may
undermine the UN’s capacity to provide international peace and security. Instead,
she sees more merit in political rather than legal solutions, and suggests that claims
regarding rights violations by the UN are settled with the member state rather than
directly with the aggrieved individual. She does not exclude, however, that a failure
to provide any form of accountability may ultimately result in domestic courts
rejecting the UN’s immunity.
The articles collected in this special issue all represent contributions to a better
understanding of the evolution of public international law in the aftermath of the
Srebrenica massacre, and to identify progress, but also serious shortcomings.
Furthermore, they provide recommendations in order to better equip the interna-
tional legal order to respond to, if not prevent, such horrifying acts.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, dis-
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author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were
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